Results | Lab on Institutional Corruption

Otten, M., & Banaji, M. R. (2012). Social categories shape the neural representation of emotion: evidence from a visual face adaptation task. Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience, 6. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnint.2012.00009

Srivastava, S. B., & Banaji, M. R. (2011). Culture, cognition, and collaborative networks in organizations. American Sociological Review, 76(2), 207–233. https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122411399390

Tsay, C.-J., & Banaji, M. R. (2011). Naturals and strivers: Preferences and beliefs about sources of achievement. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47(2), 460–465. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2010.12.010

Hardin, C. D., & Banaji, M. R. (2013). The nature of implicit prejudice: Implications for personal and public policy. In The behavioral foundations of public policy (pp. 13–31). Princeton University Press.

Summary. In this chapter, we address the topics of stereotyping and prejudice, staying firmly within the bounds of what science has demonstrated. However, in keeping with the mission of this book, we spell out what we see to be some obvious, and also some less obvious, tentacles to questions of public policy. We posed the following questions to ourselves: What are the broad lessons learned that have changed our understanding of human nature and social relations in recent decades? In what way does the new view run counter to long-held assumptions? How should policy involving intergroup relations proceed in light of these discoveries? And, can we speak about "personal policies" that may emerge from the education of individuals about the constraints and flexibility of their own minds while also considering the notion of policy in the usual "public" sense? Our contention is that personal arid public policy discussions regarding prejudice and discrimination are too often-based on an outdated notion of the nature of prejudice. Most continue to view prejudice as it was formulated generations ago: negative attitudes about social groups and their members rooted in ignorance and perpetuated by individuals motivated-by animus and hatred. The primary implication of the old view was that prejudice is best addressed by changing the hearts and minds of individuals, for good-hearted people will think well of others and behave accordingly. However, research in recent years demonstrates that the old view of prejudice is incomplete, even dangerously so. Staying with it would lead to policy choices that might be ineffectual, or worse. Staying with it would be akin to ignoring the evidence on smoking and cancer. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved)

Carney, D. R., & Banaji, M. R. (2012). First is best. PLoS ONE, 7(6), e35088. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0035088

Dunham, Y., Baron, A. S., & Banaji, M. R. (2016). The development of implicit gender attitudes. Developmental Science, 19(5), 781–789. https://doi.org/10.1111/desc.12321

Dunham, Y., Chen, E. E., & Banaji, M. R. (2013). Two signatures of implicit intergroup attitudes: developmental invariance and early enculturation. Psychological Science, 24(6), 860–868. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797612463081

Heiphetz, L., Spelke, E. S., & Banaji, M. R. (2014). The formation of belief-based social preferences. Social Cognition, 32(1), 22–47. https://doi.org/10.1521/soco.2014.32.1.22

Heiphetz, L., Spelke, E. S., & Banaji, M. R. (2013). Patterns of implicit and explicit attitudes in children and adults: Tests in the domain of religion. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 142(3), 864–879. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0029714

Contreras, J. M., Banaji, M. R., & Mitchell, J. P. (2012). Dissociable neural correlates of stereotypes and other forms of semantic knowledge. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 7(7), 764–770. https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsr053

Greenwald, A. G., Banaji, M. R., & Nosek, B. A. (2015). Statistically small effects of the Implicit Association Test can have societally large effects. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 108(4), 553–561. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspa0000016

Kubota, J. T., Banaji, M. R., & Phelps, E. A. (2012). The neuroscience of race. Nature Neuroscience, 15(7), 940–948. https://doi.org/10.1038/nn.3136

Lehr, S. A., Ferreira, M. L., & Banaji, M. R. (2019). When outgroup negativity trumps ingroup positivity: Fans of the Boston Red Sox and New York Yankees place greater value on rival losses than own-team gains. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 22(1), 26–42. https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430217712834

Olson, K. R., Dweck, C. S., Spelke, E. S., & Banaji, M. R. (2011). Children’s responses to group-based inequalities: perpetuation and rectification. Social Cognition, 29(3), 270–287. https://doi.org/10.1521/soco.2011.29.3.270

Contreras, J. M., Banaji, M. R., & Mitchell, J. P. (2013). Multivoxel patterns in fusiform face area differentiate faces by sex and race. PLoS ONE, 8(7), e69684. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0069684

Contreras, J. M., Schirmer, J., Banaji, M. R., & Mitchell, J. P. (2013). Common brain regions with distinct patterns of neural responses during mentalizing about groups and individuals. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 25(9), 1406–1417. https://doi.org/10.1162/jocn_a_00403

Summary. An individual has a mind; a group does not. Yet humans routinely endow groups with mental states irreducible to any of their members (e.g., “scientists hope to understand every aspect of nature”). But are these mental states categorically similar to those we attribute to individuals? In two fMRI experiments, we tested this question against a set of brain regions that are consistently associated with social cognition—medial pFC, anterior temporal lobe, TPJ, and medial parietal cortex. Participants alternately answered questions about the mental states and physical attributes of individual people and groups. Regions previously associated with mentalizing about individuals were also robustly responsive to judgments of groups, suggesting that perceivers deploy the same social-cognitive processes when thinking about the mind of an individual and the “mind” of a group. However, multivariate searchlight analysis revealed that several of these regions showed distinct multivoxel patterns of response to groups and individual people, suggesting that perceivers maintain distinct representations of groups and individuals during mental state inferences. These findings suggest that perceivers mentalize about groups in a manner qualitatively similar to mentalizing about individual people, but that the brain nevertheless maintains important distinctions between the representations of such entities.

Heiphetz, L., Spelke, E. S., Harris, P. L., & Banaji, M. R. (2014). What do different beliefs tell us? An examination of factual, opinion-based, and religious beliefs. Cognitive Development, 30, 15–29. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2013.12.002

Ho, A. K., Sidanius, J., Levin, D. T., & Banaji, M. R. (2011). Evidence for hypodescent and racial hierarchy in the categorization and perception of biracial individuals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100(3), 492–506. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0021562

Heiphetz, L., Spelke, E. S., Harris, P. L., & Banaji, M. R. (2013). The development of reasoning about beliefs: Fact, preference, and ideology. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 49(3), 559–565. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2012.09.005

Ho, A. K., Sidanius, J., Cuddy, A. J. C., & Banaji, M. R. (2013). Status boundary enforcement and the categorization of black–white biracials. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 49(5), 940–943. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2013.04.010

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