Your search

Summary. The general public is skeptical of our current system of campaign finance and feels that members of Congress are corrupt. Although the scholarly literature on campaign contribution influence is mixed, there is growing consensus that Political Action Committees (PACs) and interest groups do, indeed, have a powerful influence on policymaking in Congress. In this article, the author reviews this literature and discusses how influence occurs. Findings reveal that influence is only very rarely an explicit quid pro quo exchange. Instead, it is typically an ongoing, implicit, reciprocal exchange that impacts multiple stages of the legislative process and yields contributors many dividends, such as softer regulations, lower taxes, and lucrative contracts—none of which are explicitly promised (except in rare cases of full-blown bribery), but are, nonetheless, regularly granted. The social relationships between contributors and lawmakers are central to this process, as is the ability to get legislators to sway their colleagues.

Summary. The public believes that politicians in the US favor special interests over their constituents and that our political institutions have become corrupt--and they are right. A growing body of evidence shows that special interests have disproportionate sway over policy via campaign contributions and lobbying. In this book, the author presents this evidence in a logical, understandable way; he then illustrates how campaign contributions harm our economy, exacerbate inequality, and undermine our democracy. One of the most startling findings of the book is that campaign contributions led to the Financial Crisis and Great Recession. The author concludes that campaign contributions have effectively created an oligarchy in the US, and, thus, reform is needed to save our democracy. The final chapter of the book suggests a number of different reforms that could be pursued--and highlights some ways in which these reforms can be achieved.

Summary. The state is responsible for maintaining law and order in society and protecting the people. Sometimes it fails to fulfill these responsibilities; in other cases, it actively harms people. There have been many instances of political corruption and state crime throughout history, with impacts that range from economic damage to physical injury to death—sometimes on a massive scale (e.g., economic recession, pollution/poisoning, genocide). The challenge for criminologists, however, is that defining political corruption and state crime can be thorny, as can identifying their perpetrators—who can often be collectives of individuals such as organizations and governments—and their victims. In turn, pinpointing appropriate avenues of controlling these crimes can be difficult. These challenges are exacerbated by power issues and the associated reality that the state is in a position to write or change laws and, in essence, regulate itself. One possible solution is to define political corruption and state crime—as well as their perpetrators and victims—as broadly as possible to include a variety of scenarios that may or may not exhibit violations of criminal law. Likewise, a resolution to the issue of social control would be to move beyond strictly institutional mechanisms of control. Criminological research should further elucidate these issues; it should also, however, move beyond conceptual dilemmas toward (a) better understanding the processes underlying political corruption/state crime and (b) illustrating the broader ramifications of these crimes.

Summary. There have been a number of high-profile cases of Congressional bribery over the years. This was especially true in the 109th House (2005-06), during which ranking members such as Tom DeLay, Bob Ney, and “Duke” Cunningham were indicted. Some members of Congress argue that these were just a “few bad apples,” but the public believes that Congress is more widely corrupt. We employ social network analysis to test which view is correct. We analyze comprehensive data on all members of the 109th House, including their roll call voting and receipts of Political Action Committee (PAC) contributions. Our results show that PAC donors had a significant influence on lawmaker voting across party—despite the fact that such influence is illegal under the Federal Bribery Statute. Accordingly, we find strong support for institutional corruption within Congress. Our findings challenge the traditional conceptualization of political bribery as an individual form of occupational crime, and we argue that it should instead be viewed as a state-corporate crime in its own right. We argue further that it can act as a facilitative process that enables other forms of state-corporate offending to occur, thereby causing social harm. The unique ability of social network analysis to treat relationships as a unit of analysis is central in these findings and conclusions. Hence, we contribute to the emerging trend of applying social network analysis in criminology by providing a new application to state-corporate offending.

Summary. In 1978, Ermann and Lundman put forth the most sophisticated organizational deviance framework to date. They conceptualized organizational deviance as actions by an organization that interfere with the flow of benefits to actors with legitimate claims upon that organization. Further, they stipulated that these claims are protected by “controlling organizations.” We apply Ermann and Lundman’s framework to Congress and conclude that it is a deviant organization. We then contemplate the challenges to social control that congressional deviance poses, and contend that the “exempt status” enjoyed by Congress—in that it writes its own rules and polices itself—should be removed.