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Negotiation games in the fight against corruption

Resource type
Author/contributor
Title
Negotiation games in the fight against corruption
Abstract
Summary. Game theory has allowed the study of the rationality of relationships among actors. This is a strategic relationship where the final outcome depends on the decisions made by each actor. As each player awaits the other player’s decision, the anticipation of the opponent’s move is essential. For game analysis, it is important to view such anticipation as a combination of expectations. When it comes to a negotiation game, the various rules of the game, the means that condition players’ moves and the projection of goals are also important. Likewise, corruption can be also analyzed as an agreement that is reached after a process of negotiation between actors. The objective of this paper is, therefore, to interpret Schelling’s negotiation games as adapted to the problem of corruption.
Publication
SSRN Electronic Journal
Date
2014
Journal Abbr
SSRN Journal
Language
en
DOI
10.2139/ssrn.2455812
ISSN
1556-5068
Accessed
9/15/20, 1:20 AM
Library Catalog
DOI.org (Crossref)
Citation
Mariano Mosquera, C. (2014). Negotiation games in the fight against corruption. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2455812