Results | Lab on Institutional Corruption

Schlosberg, J. (2018). Digital agenda setting: re-examining the role of platform monopolies. In M. Moore & D. Tambini (Eds.), Digital Dominance: The Power of Google, Amazon, Facebook, and Apple. Oxford University Press. https://global.oup.com/academic/product/digital-dominance-9780190845124?cc=gb&lang=en&#

Summary. This book section interrogates the specific role of platform monopolies in shaping and framing public debate, arguing that far from ‘pluralising’ the agenda, the particular characteristics of news and information algorithms are more likely to be having the opposite effect on balance, reinforcing the dominance of a small number of mostly legacy, incumbent news brands.

Heerwig, J., & McCabe, B. (2018, May 29). Democracy vouchers broadened Seattle’s 2017 donor base. Brennan Center for Justice. https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/democracy-vouchers-broadened-seattles-2017-donor-base

Lewis, L. (2018, May 3). How bankruptcy law could keep money — and the truth — from Weinstein’s victims. Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/how-bankruptcy-law-could-keep-money--and-the-truth--from-weinsteins-victims/2018/05/02/88f29b12-4e3f-11e8-84a0-458a1aa9ac0a_story.html

Summary. One way bankruptcy law can be used to shield wrongdoers.

Laver, R. (2018, May). Libranos del mal: la corrupcion y el desafio para la fe y la iglesia cristiana en America Latina. https://wipfandstock.com/libranos-del-mal.html

Summary. Research focused on institutional corruption from a socio-cultural perspective in relation to Latin America and the potential of a faith-based collective action to effect sustainable reform.

Morris, A. J., Mello, M. M., Sanford, J. A., Green, R. B., Wald, S. H., Kadry, B., & Macario, A. (2018). Commentary: how should hospitals respond to surgeons’ requests to schedule overlapping surgeries? Neurosurgery, 82(4), E91–E98. https://doi.org/10.1093/neuros/nyx627

Summary. Provides recommendations to hospitals dealing with surgeons’ requests to double-book operations.

Lexchin, J., Kohler, J. C., Gagnon, M.-A., Crombie, J., Thacker, P., & Shnier, A. (2018). Combating corruption in the pharmaceutical arena. Indian Journal of Medical Ethics. https://doi.org/10.20529/IJME.2018.022

Marin Diaz, J. P. (2018, March 11). Californication. Cuestión Pública. https://cuestionpublica.com/californication/

Summary. For 2 years we have worked with another newsroom in Colombia to investigate the assets of congressmen with very interesting findings, like the one about the wife of a former president of Colombia buying cheap land to later make millions in returns by allegedly changing land use, this congressman is former president Álvaro Uribe how is now under house arrest for procedural fraud with the bribing of witnesses using the very same house complex detailed in that investigation we participated in. Another interesting result was a congressman buying natural reserves to sell them back to the government.

McCabe, B., & Heerwig, J. (2018, February 16). Expanding participation in municipal campaigns: evaluating the impact of Seattle’s democracy voucher program. Center for Studies in Demography and Ecology. https://csde.washington.edu/seminar/expanding-participation-in-municipal-campaigns-evaluating-the-impact-of-seattles-democracy-voucher-program/

Robertson, C. T., & Winkelman, D. (2018). Incentives, lies, and disclosure. Social Science Research Network. https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3118359

Summary. Prosecutors can force witnesses to testify and use perjury prosecutions to hold them to the provable truth. More controversially, prosecutors also offer witnesses inducements for favorable testimony, including leniency, immunity, and even cash. This ubiquitous behavior would be illegal as witness bribery, except for a longstanding tradition of sovereigns using this power, which legal doctrine now reflects. A causal analysis shows that even if prosecutors use this power only in good faith, these inducements undermine the epistemic value of witness testimony.

Milovanovitch, M., Denisova-Schmidt, E., & Anapiosyan, A. (2018). Conflict of interest in Eastern Europe: “academic capture.” International Higher Education, 92, 29–30. https://doi.org/10.6017/ihe.2018.92.10289

Summary. Lobbying public officials is common practice, but becomes problematic when officials have a financial interest in the sector that lobbies them and for which they are responsible. This article explores such cases, with a particular focus on Eastern Europe.

Anapiosyan, A., & Milovanovitch, M. (2018). Academic affiliations and conflict of interest of public officials: initial evidence from East and South-East Europe and Central Asia. Journal of the European Higher Education Area, 1(1). https://etico.iiep.unesco.org/en/resource/academic-affiliations-and-conflict-interest-public-officials-initial-evidence-east-and

Summary. We explore affiliations of high-level public officials in East and South-East Europe and Central Asia with higher education institutions, which create a risk of undue influence because of conflict of interest.

Charbonneau, M., & Gagnon, M.-A. (2018). Surviving niche busters: Main strategies employed by Canadian private insurers facing the arrival of high cost specialty drugs. Health Policy, 122(12), 1295–1301. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2018.08.006

Denisova-Schmidt, E. (2018). Corruption, the lack of academic integrity and other ethical issues in higher education: what can be done within the bologna process? In A. Curaj, L. Deca, & R. Pricopie (Eds.), European Higher Education Area: The Impact of Past and Future Policies (pp. 61–75). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77407-7_5

Summary. Transparency International (TI), an NGO working on corruption worldwide, commonly defines corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain.” In higher education, however, corruption also encompasses “the lack of academic integrity.” The second definition applies to both public and private institutions, since what they both offer—education—can be construed as a public good. Corruption might be perceived or it might not; in higher education, however, this differentiation is less relevant. Along with the kinds of monetary and non-monetary corruption that can be found anywhere in society, such as corruption in procurement and favouritism in hiring and/or promoting employees, corruption in higher education can implicate the students themselves, thus exerting an influence over the next generation.

Denisova-Schmidt, E., & Prytula, Y. (2018). Business corruption in Ukraine: A way to get things done? Business Horizons, 61(6), 867–879. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bushor.2018.06.004

Johnston, M. (2018). Reforming reform: revising the anticorruption playbook. Daedalus, 147(3), 50–62. https://doi.org/10.1162/daed_a_00502

Includes discussion of ways in which mainstream reforms do not address institutional/legal/influence-market corruption.

Kurdi, B., Diaz, A. J., Wilmuth, C. A., Friedman, M. C., & Banaji, M. R. (2018). Variations in the relationship between memory confidence and memory accuracy: The effects of spontaneous accessibility, list length, modality, and complexity. Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice, 5(1), 3–28. https://doi.org/10.1037/cns0000117

Maciel, G. G., & de Sousa, L. (2018). Legal corruption and dissatisfaction with democracy in the European Union. Social Indicators Research, 140(2), 653–674. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-017-1779-x

Summary. Two-year research project on Ethics and Integrity in Public Life, conducted by the Instituto de Ciências Sociais da Universidade de Lisboa (ICS-ULisboa), Portugal and financed by Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos (FFMS).The project focus on ethics self-regulatory measures implemented by representative institutions across the EU democracies.

Milovanovitch, M. (2018). Integrity of education systems: a methodology for sector assessment. OECD Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia. https://www.oecd.org/corruption/acn/OECD-ACN-Integrity-of-Education-Systems-ENG.pdf

Heerwig, J. A. (2017). Money in the middle: contribution strategies among affluent donors to federal elections, 1980–2008. American Journal of Sociology, 123(4), 1004–1063. https://doi.org/10.1086/694888

Summary. Scholars across the social sciences have long hypothesized that individual contributors often make political contributions on the basis of partisanship or ideology and that the most active donors may be the most ideologically motivated. But drawing from a newly constructed “big” data set called the Longitudinal Elite Contributor Database (LECD), the author shows that past studies have failed to detect several striking patterns in the strategies of individual contributors: (1) a persistent positive association between frequency of giving and bipartisan or “split contributing” and (2) significant declines in the likelihood of bipartisan contributing since the late 1980s. The author shows that donors who give to both parties also target more moderate incumbents of each political party, relative to partisan donors. Taken together, the findings suggest that repeat individual donors are less partisan in their strategies, and vis-à-vis the incumbents to whom they send donations, these repeat contributors are also less ideologically extreme.

Lewis, L. (2017, August 11). Takata air bags could injure drivers for years to come—and no one may be liable to help the victims. Slate Magazine. https://slate.com/business/2017/08/no-one-wants-to-pay-for-takatas-future-victims.html

Summary. Automakers are using the bankruptcy process to ensure their responsibility is limited.

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