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Summary. Game theory has allowed the study of the rationality of relationships among actors. This is a strategic relationship where the final outcome depends on the decisions made by each actor. As each player awaits the other player’s decision, the anticipation of the opponent’s move is essential. For game analysis, it is important to view such anticipation as a combination of expectations. When it comes to a negotiation game, the various rules of the game, the means that condition players’ moves and the projection of goals are also important. Likewise, corruption can be also analyzed as an agreement that is reached after a process of negotiation between actors. The objective of this paper is, therefore, to interpret Schelling’s negotiation games as adapted to the problem of corruption.
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Summary. This essay explores how oil and gas companies exploit secret settlements with families harmed by fracking in order to suppress evidence of the harmful effects of their commercial practices.
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Summary. This article outlines the systemic ethical implications of public-private partnerships with the food and soda industry—including research agenda distortion and framing effects (such as the characterization of obesity primarily as a problem of individual behavior, and the minimization or neglect of food systems and the role of powerful corporate actors in those systems).
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Summary. This paper most specifically draws from the the conceptual frames developed in the IC Safra Lab - although their explicit reference to it varies. The risk of IC to public credibility of scientific and scholarly institutions stands at the focus of this work, especially the paradox of the pursuit of value-free science as a value-laden approach to defend this credibility without accountability.
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Summary. An analysis of corruption and misappropriation in World Bank projects using original data. When World Bank projects are targeted at a more specific constituency, there are fewer problems with corruption.
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Summary. A survey experiment that examines whether voters forgive corruption when they learn that politicians otherwise performed well in office. For the most part, they do not.
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Summary. Explores how liability concerns influence physicians to order tests that patients don’t need.
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Summary. An individual has a mind; a group does not. Yet humans routinely endow groups with mental states irreducible to any of their members (e.g., “scientists hope to understand every aspect of nature”). But are these mental states categorically similar to those we attribute to individuals? In two fMRI experiments, we tested this question against a set of brain regions that are consistently associated with social cognition—medial pFC, anterior temporal lobe, TPJ, and medial parietal cortex. Participants alternately answered questions about the mental states and physical attributes of individual people and groups. Regions previously associated with mentalizing about individuals were also robustly responsive to judgments of groups, suggesting that perceivers deploy the same social-cognitive processes when thinking about the mind of an individual and the “mind” of a group. However, multivariate searchlight analysis revealed that several of these regions showed distinct multivoxel patterns of response to groups and individual people, suggesting that perceivers maintain distinct representations of groups and individuals during mental state inferences. These findings suggest that perceivers mentalize about groups in a manner qualitatively similar to mentalizing about individual people, but that the brain nevertheless maintains important distinctions between the representations of such entities.
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Summary. This piece explores the similarities and differences between the ethical and regulatory issues raised by direct-to-consumer advertising of prescription drugs and those raised by the promotion of foods for their purported health-benefits.
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Summary. The general public is skeptical of our current system of campaign finance and feels that members of Congress are corrupt. Although the scholarly literature on campaign contribution influence is mixed, there is growing consensus that Political Action Committees (PACs) and interest groups do, indeed, have a powerful influence on policymaking in Congress. In this article, the author reviews this literature and discusses how influence occurs. Findings reveal that influence is only very rarely an explicit quid pro quo exchange. Instead, it is typically an ongoing, implicit, reciprocal exchange that impacts multiple stages of the legislative process and yields contributors many dividends, such as softer regulations, lower taxes, and lucrative contracts—none of which are explicitly promised (except in rare cases of full-blown bribery), but are, nonetheless, regularly granted. The social relationships between contributors and lawmakers are central to this process, as is the ability to get legislators to sway their colleagues.