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Summary. Among the obstacles to developing geothermal resources in Indonesia, corruption linked to fuel subsidies and the permitting of forest areas looms large.

Summary. Voters are less likely to identify with a political party that has been associated with corruption.

Summary. Voters distinguish between scandals implicating a chief executive directly and those involving members of the government bureaucracy.

Summary. Like all physicians, radiologists in the United States are subject to frequent and costly medical malpractice claims. Legal scholars and physicians concur that the US civil justice system is neither precise nor accurate in determining whether malpractice has truly occurred in cases in which claims are made. Sometimes, this inaccuracy is driven by biases inherent in medical expert-witness opinions. For example, expert-witness testimony involving "missed" radiology findings can be negatively affected by several cognitive biases, such as contextual bias, hindsight bias, and outcome bias. Biases inherent in the US legal system, such as selection bias, compensation bias, and affiliation bias, also play important roles. Fortunately, many of these biases can be significantly mitigated or eliminated through the use of appropriate blinding techniques. This paper reviews the major works on expert-witness blinding in the legal scholarship and the radiology professional literature. Its purpose is to acquaint the reader with the evidence that unblinded expert-witness testimony is tainted by multiple sources of bias and to examine proposed strategies for addressing these biases through blinding.

Summary. Game theory has allowed the study of the rationality of relationships among actors. This is a strategic relationship where the final outcome depends on the decisions made by each actor. As each player awaits the other player’s decision, the anticipation of the opponent’s move is essential. For game analysis, it is important to view such anticipation as a combination of expectations. When it comes to a negotiation game, the various rules of the game, the means that condition players’ moves and the projection of goals are also important. Likewise, corruption can be also analyzed as an agreement that is reached after a process of negotiation between actors. The objective of this paper is, therefore, to interpret Schelling’s negotiation games as adapted to the problem of corruption.

Summary. This essay explores how oil and gas companies exploit secret settlements with families harmed by fracking in order to suppress evidence of the harmful effects of their commercial practices.

Summary. This article outlines the systemic ethical implications of public-private partnerships with the food and soda industry—including research agenda distortion and framing effects (such as the characterization of obesity primarily as a problem of individual behavior, and the minimization or neglect of food systems and the role of powerful corporate actors in those systems).

Summary. This paper most specifically draws from the the conceptual frames developed in the IC Safra Lab - although their explicit reference to it varies. The risk of IC to public credibility of scientific and scholarly institutions stands at the focus of this work, especially the paradox of the pursuit of value-free science as a value-laden approach to defend this credibility without accountability.

Summary. The law has long been concerned with the agency problems that arise when advisors, such as attorneys or physicians, put themselves in financial relationships that create conflicts of interest. If the financial relationship is "material" to the transactions proposed by the advisor, then non-disclosure of the relationship may be pertinent to claims of malpractice, informed consent, and even fraud, as well as to professional discipline. In these sorts of cases, materiality is closely related to the question of causation, roughly turning on whether the withheld information might have changed the decision of a reasonable advisee (i.e., a patient). The injured plaintiff will predictably testify that the information would have impacted his or her choice, but that self-serving testimony may be unreliable. The fact finder is left to speculate about the counterfactual world in which the information was disclosed. This Article shows how randomized vignette-based experimentation may create a valuable form of evidence to address these questions, for both litigation and policymaking. To demonstrate this method and investigate conflicts of interest in healthcare in particular, we recruited 691 human subjects and asked them to imagine themselves as patients facing a choice about whether to undergo a cardiac stenting procedure recommended by a cardiologist. We manipulated the vignettes in a 2 x 3 between-subjects design, where we systematically varied the appropriateness of the proposed treatment, which was described in terms of patient risk without the procedure (low or high), and manipulated the type of disclosure provided by the physician (none, standard, or enhanced). We used physician ownership of the specialty hospital where the surgery would be performed as the conflict of interest, disclosed or not, and the "enhanced" disclosure included notice that such relationships have been associated with biases in prescribing behavior. We found that the mock patients were significantly less likely to follow the cardiologist's recommendation of surgical implantation of a drug-eluting stent when he disclosed a financial conflict of interest, regardless of whether the disclosure was standard or enhanced. We also found that the mock patients were more likely to choose the treatment when they faced greater risk without it. We did not, however, find that the disclosure made patients more discerning about the appropriateness of the procedure. We discuss the implications for law and policy. Mock patients seem likely to act upon such information, declining the low-value healthcare when conflicts are disclosed. This finding suggests that the information is material to such transactions, and that disclosures may be salutary for medical decisions. Arguably, therefore, physicians already have a duty under the common law to disclose the financial relationships they choose to accept. Other regulators and policymakers should recognize and clarify this duty, and courts should embrace this form of evidence. Methodologically, although this empirical approach has limits, it reduces speculation by fact finders and policymakers, by at least focusing their attention on the right questions.

Summary. An analysis of corruption and misappropriation in World Bank projects using original data. When World Bank projects are targeted at a more specific constituency, there are fewer problems with corruption.

Summary. A survey experiment that examines whether voters forgive corruption when they learn that politicians otherwise performed well in office. For the most part, they do not.